Article Summary of "Mediating the Oslo Accords on the Middle East" by Negotiation Newsletter
Citation: "Norway's back-channel success story." Negotiation Newsletter. Spring-Summer 1995. Pp. 1,11.
This Article Summary written by: Mariya Yevsyukova, Conflict Research Consortium
This article explores Norway's success in mediating international conflicts,
particularly its facilitation of negotiations between Israel and PLO, which resulted in
signing a "Declaration of Principles". Jan Egeland, Secretary of State of
Norway, explores some of the reasons for such a success of "back channel" peace
negotiations, and the lessons from his experience.
The approach used was to facilitate negotiations on the official level, but without
publicizing them. At that time, Norway had a better chance to succeed in Middle East
negotiations than the United States, whose negotiations were in stalemate. The reasons
were the following: (1) Norway had a smaller bureaucratic machine which allowed it to
decide on facilitation and implement this decision in a short period of time; (2) Norway's
foreign policy was coherent and consistent; (3) Norway had a relatively independent
international position, not being under any economic or political obligations. This
contributed to its impartiality as a facilitator. (4) For a small country like Norway, it
was easier to keep the process in secret.
Norway's limitations included the small state's dependence on the United States and
European Union in pressuring the parties to follow the letter of the agreement and its
inability to provide incentives for the parties to start negotiations.
Egeland identified several lessons that he learned from Middle East conflict
facilitation. They include (1) keeping the process in secret; (2) questioning the parties
intentions because some would try to make an impression that they want a negotiated
solution, but in reality would have little interest in peace; (3) disagreements within the
parties intensify when the agreement is close to be concluded; (4) power imbalance and the
ability of a stronger party to "tilt an agreement" might cause the mediator to
become perceived biased in the eyes of another party (p. 11); (5) the parties want to be
treated equally; (6) when the solution does not constitute a victory but is based on a
compromise, public opinion about the leaders inside their countries might fall even if
they gain international support.
Given its proclivities and abilities, Norway receives a lot of requests for
facilitation conflict resolution processes. It is working on developing a strategy of
quick response to those calls. It first holds meetings with both sides of the conflict,
exploring the extent of commitment to negotiated settlement of both sides. Most of
the conflicts involve the issue of minority dissatisfaction with their position inside a
bigger entity. The mediators thus try to facilitate the development of a formula for some
kind of autonomy for the minority party. Norway is planning to organize a group of
governmental and nongovernmental workers who would be able to quickly respond to the
requests for third party intervention. Many Norwegians are trained in performing such
functions and the country has technology which can help to establish communication between
the parties in regions where direct communication between the opponents is problematic.
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