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Book Summary of Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War by Alexander George
Citation:
Alexander George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991).
This Book Summary written by: Tanya Glaser, Conflict Research Consortium
p>George develops a general conceptual framework for coercive diplomacy. He then examines
a number of cases of coercive diplomacy, both successful and unsuccessful. Drawing on
these cases George offers strategic guidelines for using coercive diplomacy. Part One
discusses the general theory of coercive diplomacy. As George explains it, "The
general idea of coercive diplomacy is to back one's demand on an adversary with a threat
of punishment for noncompliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to
persuade him to comply with the demand."[p. 4]
Coercive diplomacy involves four basic variables: the demand, the means used for
creating a sense of urgency, the threatened punishment for noncompliance, and the possible
use of incentives. Differences in these variables yield five types of coercive diplomacy.
George identifies these basic types as the ultimatum, the tacit ultimatum, the
"try-and-see" approach, the "gradual turning of the screw,"and finally
the "carrot and stick approach".
The logic behind coercive diplomacy assumes that target will behave rationally.
However, George concludes that the adversary's perception of the coercing power's
motivation and commitment, and the adversary's assessment of the credibility and potency
of its threat, play the most significant role in determining the success or failure of a
coercive strategy.
In Part Two, George analyzes historical cases of coercive diplomacy. In July 1941, the
U.S. threatened Japan with an oil embargo unless Japan withdrew from China. George
suggests a number of reasons why coercive diplomacy not only failed, but actually provoked
war in this case. In 1961, the U.S. President Kennedy successfully employed coercive
diplomacy for the limited objective of defending the royalist forces in Laos. In the Fall
of 1962 the Soviet Union deployed ballistic missiles in Cuba. Kennedy again employed
coercive diplomacy successfully to compel the Soviet Union to remove the missiles. During
the Vietnam War, President Johnson launched air strikes against Hanoi in an unsuccessful
attempt to coerce them into ending their support of the Viet Cong forces. In the early
1980s, the U.S. applied coercive diplomacy in Nicaragua to limit the influence of Marxist
revolutionaries. However, U.S. pressure ultimately played a small role in ending
Sandinista rule in Nicaragua. President Reagan applied coercive diplomacy against Libya in
an attempt to end Libyan support of terrorism. While this policy culminated in air strikes
against Libya, it is not clear that coercion significantly reduced Libya's terrorist
activities.
In late 1990, a U.S. led international coalition of states attempted to use coercive
diplomacy to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Initially, the coalition used a
"gradual turning of the screw" strategy by imposing and progressively tightening
an embargo on Iraqi imports and exports. By early 1991 the strategy had shifted to an
ultimatum backed by the threat of military force. Iraq called the coalition's bluff, and
war broke out shortly after the ultimatum's January 15 deadline.
In Part Three, George describes contexts in which coercive diplomacy may be an
appropriate response, and the factors which make coercive diplomacy likely to be a
successful response. George argues that the choice of a particular coercive diplomatic
strategy depends crucially on the context of the crisis event. He identifies contextual
variables which figure significantly in the choice of a coercive strategy. These variables
include the integrative potential of the conflict, the costs of war, the parties' sense of
urgency and the presence of allies for each party.
Based on his examination of cases, George argues that there is no single sufficient
condition for the successful employment of coercive diplomacy. Instead there are a number
of factors which favor, but do not guarantee, the strategy's success. These factors
include clear and consistent demands, adequate motivation, ability to instill a sense of
urgency in the opponent, and the opponent's fear of escalation. Because the key factors
influencing the success or failure of coercive diplomacy are psychological in nature, it
is very difficult to predict or guarantee success in any particular case. George concludes
that while coercive diplomacy may be less costly than use of military force, it will only
rarely be a high-confidence strategy.
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